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increases the equilibrium response of ination to non-policy shocks. Moreover, a weaker
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These results are due to variation in the value of public debt that lead to wealth
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1 Introduction
Using a micro-founded model, we address two classic questions in monetary economics and
policy in this paper. First, can a time-varying ination target decisively inuence the path
of actual ination? In other words, does monetary policy properly control the dynamics
and path of ination? Second, what are the e¤ects of changes in monetary and scal policy
stances on the equilibrium response of ination to various shocks impinging on the economy?
For example, what happens to the equilibrium behavior of ination when the monetary policy
stance changes to a more aggressive response to ination? Does the scal policy stance with
respect to public debt matter for ination dynamics? If yes, then how does a variation in
the scal policy stance a¤ect ination?
These issues, while long of great interest in monetary economics, have received a renewed
interest recently in the literature.1 A prominent illustration is provided by the research that
aims to provide an explanation for the low frequency movement of ination in the U.S.,
especially, the rise of ination in the 1970s and the subsequent fall in the 1980s. Proposed
explanations typically rely on changes in the dynamics of the ination target and/or changes
in policy stances.2
For example, Ireland (2007) and Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010) propose a rise in
a persistent time-varying ination target as an explanation for the rise of ination in the
1970s: Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), and Bhattarai, Lee,
and Park (2012) argue that a weak monetary policy stance with respect to ination, or a
passive monetary policy regime, in the pre-Volcker period implied indeterminacy of equilibria,
which in turn, led to a rise of ination due to self-fullling beliefs.3 These papers provide
evidence that post-Volcker, ination stabilization was successful because of an aggressive
monetary policy stance with respect to ination, that is, an active monetary policy regime.
Finally, Sims (2011) and Bianchi and Ilut (2012) argue that a weak response of taxes to debt,
or an active scal policy regime, led to an increase in ination in the 1970s as a response to
increases in government spending. These authors argue that after the 1970s; the scal policy
stance changed to one that implied a passive policy regime, that is, taxes responded strongly
1For a recent survey of the literature on monetary and scal policy interactions, see Canzoneri, Cumby,
and Diba (2011).
2There are also some well-known papers that provide a learning-based explanation for the rise and fall of
U.S. ination. See for example, Primiceri (2006) and Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2006). Moreover, some
papers have attributed the rise and fall of U.S. ination mostly to time-varying volatility of shocks. See for
example, Sims and Zha (2006).
3We use the language of Leeper (1991) in characterizing policies as active and passive. Under an active
monetary policy regime, nominal interest rates react strongly to ination while under an active scal policy
regime, taxes respond weakly to debt outstanding. What exactly constitutes active and passive monetary
and scal policy is model-specic. Later, we precisely state the bounds on policy parameters that lead to a
particular policy regime combination in our model.
2
to debt. This choked o¤ the possibility of rising ination in response to scal shocks.
Motivated by these theoretical and empirical considerations, we provide a complete and
analytical characterization, to the best of our knowledge for the rst time in the literature,
of these questions in a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. At
rst, we use a relatively simple model that enables us to derive sharp and clear closed-form
results. The baseline model that we solve in closed-form is a standard sticky price model that
features simple monetary and scal policy rules, lump-sum taxes, and one-period nominal
government bonds. We focus on the correlation between actual ination and the ination
target and conduct comparative static exercises related to the impact on ination of changing
monetary and scal policy stances. We nd that the results of these experiments depend
critically on the prevailing monetary and scal policy regimes.
In particular, we analyze three di¤erent policy regimes. First, an active monetary and
passive scal policy regime, where a high response of interest rates to ination is coupled with
a high response of taxes to outstanding public debt. This is the most common policy regime
considered in the literature where a unique bounded equilibrium exists. In this regime,
ination closely follows the path of the ination target. In fact, stronger the systematic
reaction of monetary policy to ination, more closely will actual ination follow the ination
target. Moreover, a stronger reaction of monetary policy to ination decreases the response
of ination to the various non-policy shocks impinging on the economy. Finally, as is well-
known, in this case, scal policy plays no role in price level determination.4
These results are standard since in this regime, monetary policy controls ination dynam-
ics. An unanticipated decrease in the ination target, which is equivalent to an unanticipated
increase in the nominal interest rate, decreases expected ination in this regime, since the
systematic response of interest rate to ination is more than one-for-one. Then, due to
the increase in the ex-ante real interest rate, the output gap and thereby, actual ination,
decrease. Moreover, stronger the systematic response of interest rates to ination, greater
is the e¤ect on the ex-ante real interest rate, which decreases the e¤ect on ination when
non-policy shocks hit the economy.
Second, we analyze an active scal and passive monetary policy regime, where a low
response of interest rates to ination is coupled with a low response of taxes to outstanding
public debt.5 A unique bounded equilibrium exists with this combination of monetary and
scal policies as well. In this regime, in sharp contrast to the previous regime, ination
moves in an opposite direction from the ination target on impact.6 In fact, stronger the
4We focus on a model with lump-sum taxes and transfers only.
5For early treatments of this policy regime in simple models, see Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), and Woodford
(1995).
6We analytically characterize the impact responses while computing the entire path of responses numeri-
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systematic reaction of monetary policy to ination, greater will be the divergence between
the ination target and actual ination. In addition, and again in sharp contrast to the active
monetary and passive scal regime, in this regime, a stronger reaction of monetary policy
to ination increases the response of ination to the various non-policy shocks impinging on
the economy.7 Moreover, now, the scal policy stance matters for the dynamics of ination.
We show that a weaker response of taxes to debt leads to a weaker response of ination to
non-policy shocks.
These results arise because of the wealth e¤ect on households of interest rate and tax
changes.8 Under the previous regime, because the systematic response of interest rates to
ination was greater than one, expected ination decreases in response to an unanticipated
increase in interest rates. In this regime, however, interest rate increases increase the value
of outstanding government debt. Since tax response to government debt is low, this increase
in interest rate leads to a positive wealth e¤ect on households, the government bond holders.
The positive wealth e¤ect then leads to increased spending and thereby, higher ination.
Moreover, greater the systematic response of interest rates to ination, as long as this re-
sponse is less than one-for-one, it only serves to make this positive wealth e¤ect stronger.
Then, the equilibrium response of ination will be even higher. Finally, given the crucial role
of government debt dynamics on equilibrium determination, it is natural that scal policy
stance now matters for the dynamics of ination. In particular, a weaker response of taxes
to debt implies that the wealth e¤ect due to tax changes is lower. Thus, ination responds
by less when non-policy shocks hit the economy.
Third, we explore a passive monetary and passive scal policy regime, where a low re-
sponse of interest rates to ination is coupled with a high response of taxes to outstanding
government debt. In this regime, there is equilibrium indeterminacy and theory provides
no clear answer on the behavior of ination. Generally, in this regime, both fundamental
and sunspot shocks play a role in price level determination. Moreover, the potential for
self-fullling beliefs implies that the e¤ects of monetary and scal policy on ination can be
very di¤erent from the cases where there is equilibrium determinacy.
While at rst we provide closed-form solutions for a simple model, in the second part of
the paper, we also conduct a quantitative experiment with a richer DSGEmodel that includes
a variety of shocks and frictions. In particular, we use a medium-scale DSGE model along
the lines of Smets and Wouters (2007), Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2007),
cally.
7This result is somewhat similar to that of Loyo (1999), who considered only a exible price economy
and showed that a strong response of interest rates to ination can lead to a hyperinationary spiral under
a passive monetary and active scal policy regime. Here, we work with a determinate equilibrium and a
sticky-price model.
8Changes in lump-sum taxes thus a¤ect consumption in this economy due to the wealth e¤ect.
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Figure 1: Ination vs. smoothed ination target under di¤erent policy regimes in an esti-
mated model using U.S. data. Source: Bhattarai, Lee, and Park (2012).
and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010). The model features stochastic growth,
sticky prices and wages with partial dynamic indexation, habit formation, endogenous capital
accumulation, and variable capacity utilization. Moreover, the economy is subject to a wide
range of shocks, such as neutral and investment specic technology shocks, preference shock,
government spending shock, price and wage markup shocks, and policy shocks.9 We show
that for a wide range of realistic parameter values, our analytical results continue to apply
in such a model.
Our results have implications for both the empirical and theoretical literature in mone-
tary economics. First, consider the recent practice, in papers that estimate monetary DSGE
models, of using a time-varying ination target process to explain the low frequency move-
ment in actual ination. For example, in a recent comprehensive study of various monetary
policy reaction functions, Curdia, Ferrero, Ng, and Tambalotti (2011) show that using a time-
varying and slow-moving ination target improves the t of the model since it helps capture
the low frequency variation in ination. Our results show that this strategy works only if one
imposes an active monetary and passive scal policy regime while estimating the model.10
Indeed, using an estimated DSGE model and a pre-Volcker and a post-Volcker subsample
analysis, in Bhattarai, Lee, and Park (2012), we show that the correlation between ination
and the smoothed ination target shock backed out after the estimation varies signicantly
9We keep the scal block of the model relatively simple even in this case by considering only lump-sum
taxes and one-period nominal government bonds.
10Curdia, Ferrero, Ng, and Tambalotti (2011) use U.S. data from 1987 : III to 2009 : III, a period during
which an active monetary and passive scal policy regime is certainly a reasonable description of policy.
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depending on which policy regime one imposes during estimation.11 Figure 1, reproduced
from that paper, makes the point especially clear. It shows for example that while under
an active monetary and passive scal policy regime, the long-run correlation between the
ination target and actual ination is high and positive, under a passive monetary and ac-
tive scal policy regime, it is strongly negative. Moreover, under a passive monetary and
passive scal policy regime, while theoretically the correlation between the ination target
and actual ination is not pinned down by theory, the gure shows that empirically, the
correlation is close to zero.
Second, our theoretical results show that the e¤ects of an aggressive monetary policy
stance, or a hawkishcentral bank, on ination depends critically on the joint behavior of
monetary and scal policy. In particular, we show that in a passive monetary and active
scal policy regime, an aggressive reaction to ination by the central bank actually ends up
increasing the response and volatility of ination to non-policy shocks. Thus, any prescription
for monetary policy behavior has to take into account the prevailing scal policy regime.12
2 Simple Model
We use a standard DSGE model with nominal rigidities that can be solved analytically.
We lay out the basic model features below while providing a complete description in the
appendix. The main actors and their decision problems are as follows.
2.1 Description
2.1.1 Households
Households, a continuum in the unit interval, face an innite horizon problem and maximize
expected discounted utility over consumption and leisure. The utility function is additively
separable over consumption and labor e¤ort.
2.1.2 Firms
Firms, a continuum in the unit interval, produce di¤erentiated goods using labor as input.
Firms have some monopoly power over setting prices, which are sticky in nominal terms.
11The estimated model in Bhattarai, Lee, and Park (2012), while richer than the analytical model we work
with in this paper, is relatively small-scale. For example, it does not feature sticky wages and endogenous
capital accumulation, features that are present in the quantitative model we use in this paper.
12Loyo (1999) uses a similar result from a exible price model to interpret the experience of Brazil in the
1970s and 1980s: Relatedly, Sims (2004) shows in a very di¤erent set-up, also a exible price model, that a
central bank might lose control of ination if it is not adequately backed up by the treasury.
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Price stickiness is modelled using the Calvo formulation where every period, rms face a
constant probability of not adjusting prices.
2.1.3 Government
The government is subject to a ow budget constraint and conducts monetary and scal
policies using endogenous feedback rules. For simplicity, we assume that the government
issues only one-period nominal debt and levies lump-sum taxes. The government controls
the one-period nominal interest rate Rt. Monetary policy is modelled using an interest rate
rule that features a systematic response of the nominal interest rate to the deviation of
ination t from a time-varying target t . The feedback parameter on ination deviation is
given by . Fiscal policy is modelled using a tax rule that features a systematic response of
the tax revenues  t to the level of outstanding government debt bt 1. The feedback parameter
on debt is given by  .
2.2 Approximate Model
We rst solve the problem of households and rms given the monetary and scal policy
rules and derive the equilibrium conditions. We then use approximation methods to solve
the model: we obtain a rst-order approximation to the equilibrium conditions around the
non-stochastic steady state.13 We provide the detailed derivations in the appendix. The
resulting model can be summarized by the following linearized equations:
~Yt = Et ~Yt+1  

R^t   Et^t+1

+ r^t (1)
^t =  ~Yt + Et^t+1 (2)
R^t =  (^t   ^t ) (3)
^ t =  b^t 1 (4)
b^t = 
 1b^t 1    1b^t    1^ t +bR^t (5)
r^t = rr^

t 1 + "r;t (6)
^t = ^

t 1 + ";t: (7)
Here, ~Yt  Y^t   Y^ nt is the output gap. That is, it is the di¤erence between actual output
13In the equations below, we use X^t to denote the log deviation of a variable Xt from its steady state X
(X^t = lnXt   ln X), except for two scal variables, b^t and ^ t. Following Woodford (2003), we let them
represent respectively the deviation of the maturity value of government debt and of government tax revenues
(net of transfers) from their steady-state levels, measured as a precentage of steady-state output: b^t = bt 
b
Y
and ^ t = t Y :
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Y^t and the natural level of output Y^ nt , the output that would prevail under exible prices.
Moreover, r^t is a composite shock that is a linear combination of the structural shocks in the
model such as technology and preference shocks. It is often referred to as the natural rate of
interest because it is the real interest rate that would prevail under exible prices. Equation
(6) shows that we assume that it follows an exogenous AR (1) process with 0 < r < 1. The
innovation "r;t has zero mean and variance 2r: Equation (7) shows that we assume that the
ination target follows an exogenous AR(1) process with 0 <  < 1. The innovation ";t
has zero mean and variance 2. Ireland (2007) models that the Federal Reserve adjusts the
ination target in response to the economys supply shocks but nds that the response is not
statistically signicant. In light of this result, we make the exogeneity assumption on ^t .
Cogley and Sbordone (2008) and Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) also use an exogenous
AR process to model the ination target.14
Equation (1), the dynamic ISequation, expresses how the output gap today is deter-
mined by the expected output gap tomorrow and the ex ante real interest rate. Equation
(2), the dynamic ASequation, describes how ination today is determined as a function
of discounted expected ination tomorrow and the output gap today. Here,  is the dis-
count factor of the household and  , which determines the slope of the AS equation, is a
composite parameter of the structural parameters. Equation (3) is the monetary policy rule
which governs the response of the nominal interest rate to the deviation of ination from
the ination target while Equation (4) is the scal policy rule which governs the response of
taxes to the real maturity value of the outstanding debt. Finally, Equation (5) is the ow
budget constraint of the government.
As is well-known, in the approximate model, the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
depends crucially on the prevailing monetary and scal policy regime. The equilibrium of the
economy will be determinate either if monetary policy is active while scal policy is passive
(the AMPF regime) or if monetary policy is passive while scal policy is active (the PMAF
regime). The equilibrium is indeterminate and multiple equilibria exist if both monetary
and scal policies are passive (the PMPF regime). In our model, monetary policy is active
if  > 1 and scal policy is active if  < 1   : Table 1 summarizes these policy regime
14The assumption that ^t is stationary implies that the monetary authority does not permanently keep
the ination target at the same level but in the long-run drives the ination target back to the non-stochastic
steady state level. We introduce this assumption for two reasons. First, the stationarity assumption allows
us to work with a standard framework. To assume that the ination target has a unit root results in
time-varying coe¢ cients of the Phillips curve as in Cogley and Sbordone (2008) or leads to a non-standard
monetary policy rule for with which the Taylor principle should be modied. Therefore, to present our point
clearly within a familiar framework, we assume that the ination target is very persistent but stationary.
Second, we will generally restrict  to values close to 1, thereby e¤ectively ensuring that ^

t captures the
persistent behavior of the ination target set by the central bank. Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010) use
the same assumption.
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Table 1: Monetary/Fiscal Policy Regimes and Equilibrium Properties
Active Money Passive Money
( > 1) ( < 1)
Active Fiscal No Equilibrium Unique Equilibrium
( < 1  )
Passive Fiscal Unique Equilibrium Multiple Equilibria
( > 1  )
combinations and the associated equilibrium outcomes.
2.3 Results
We analytically characterize the solution of the model either when a determinate equilibrium
exists or when there are multiple equilibria. We then derive several results regarding the
dynamics of ination. Specically, we study how the path of ination depends on the path
of the ination target and how the response of ination changes when monetary and scal
policy stances change within a policy regime combination. All the details of the derivations
and the proofs of the various propositions are in the appendix.
2.3.1 Active Monetary and Passive Fiscal Policy
Under an active monetary and passive scal policy regime, we can express the solution for
ination as:
^t = () ^

t +   () r^

t ; (8)
where  () and   () are functions of the monetary policy response parameter .15 Note
that in this case, as Equation (8) makes clear, the dynamics of ination do not depend on the
dynamics of government debt and scal policy. Therefore, debt b^t 1 is not a state variable
that determines ination and the scal policy response parameter  does not a¤ect ination.
Moreover, this implies that ination is solely a function of the two exogenous processes,
^t and r^

t ; since other than the budget constraint, the rest of the model is completely
forward-looking:
We next characterize several properties of the solution. We rst start with the response
of ination to changes in the ination target.
15Obviously,  () and   () in Equation (8) are a function of other structural parameters as well. Here
on after, we write the coe¢ cients in a solution for ination as a function of policy parameters only so as to
highlight their role in determining ination dynamics.
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Proposition 1 (Direction of ination response) When monetary policy is active and
scal policy is passive (AMPF), ination moves in the same direction as the ination target
that is,
 ()  0:
The equality holds when prices are completely sticky ( = 0). Moreover, ination responds
more (or less) than one-for-one to changes in the ination target if prices are su¢ ciently
exible (or sticky):
1 <  () , for  >
(1  ) (1  )

;
0   ()  1, for 0    (1  ) (1  )

:
In this regime, since ination moves in the same direction as the ination target, we see
clearly that monetary policy controls the dynamics of ination. Consider a positive shock to
^t : From Equation (3), this leads to a decrease in the nominal interest rate R^t: Since in this
regime the central bank systematically changes nominal interest rates more than one-for-one
to changes in ination ( > 1), a decrease in R^t brings expected ination up. This implies
that the ex-ante real interest rate R^t  Et^t+1 goes down. From, Equation (1), this leads to
an increase in the output gap ~Yt and then from Equation (2), it leads to an increase in actual
ination ^t: Thus, ^t and ^

t are positively correlated.
Moreover, as is natural, the response of ination to the ination target shock depends on
the extent of price stickiness in the economy: greater the degree of price stickiness, smaller is
the response of ination. As a limiting result, the proposition also shows that ination does
not respond to the ination target at all when prices are completely sticky because the price
level would not respond at all to any shocks. In contrast, when prices are su¢ ciently exible,
ination responds more than one-for-one to changes in the ination target. This is possible
because due to two factors. First, from Equation (3), we see that on impact, a unit increase
in ^t decreases R^t by more than a unit (since  > 1).
16 At a given level of ^t; from Equation
(1), ~Yt increases and in equilibrium, if  is large enough, which implies that ination is quite
sensitive to changes in the output gap, then Equation (2) shows that the increase in ^t can
be by more than a unit.
Now let us consider a comparative static exercise with respect to the monetary policy
parameter , which is a measure of the monetary policy stance.
Proposition 2 (Magnitude of ination response and monetary policy stance) When
16To emphasize, this is in a partial equilibrium sense.
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monetary policy is active and scal policy is passive (AMPF), the response of ination to
changes in the ination target is decreasing (or increasing) in  if prices are su¢ ciently
exible (or sticky):
@ ()
@
< 0, for  >
(1  ) (1  )

;
@ ()
@
> 0, for 0    (1  ) (1  )

:
In combination with Proposition 1, we now have the intuitive result that ^t will move
more closely with ^t as  increases  for all values of . Again, in this sense, monetary
policy controls ination successfully in this regime. Thus, if the central banks objective is to
stabilize the ination gap,^t ^t , it needs to have a large value for , or respond strongly to
the ination gap. As  is higher, in this active monetary regime, expected ination increases
by less for a given increase in ^t , thereby dampening down the response of ination.
To make the results even more transparent, we show in Figure 2 the impulse response
of ination to an exogenous change in the ination target, varying the degree of monetary
policy stance.17 Figure 2 clearly shows that ination dynamics closely mimic those of the
ination target. The completely forward-looking nature of the model with the scal variables
being redundant makes the ination dynamics particularly simple. Note that if the ination
target moves persistently, so does ination. In addition, we can see that ination responds
more than one-for-one to changes in the ination target because  () > 1 at our benchmark
parameterization.18 Not surprisingly, however, ination is closer to the target rate as the
monetary authority responds more strongly to the ination gap.
We next analyze the response of ination to the non-policy shock r^t :
Proposition 3 (Direction of ination response) When monetary policy is active and
scal policy is passive (AMPF), ination moves in the same directions in response to the
non-policy shock, r^t that is,
  () > 0:
The proposition thus establishes that when monetary policy is active, ination moves in
the same direction as the natural rate of interest r^t : In particular, we show in the appendix
that demand-type shocks such as preference shocks increase r^t , while supply-type shocks
such as technology shocks lower r^t . Hence, the proposition tells us that ination increases in
17For this and the other gures in the analytical model section, we assign some standard values to model
parameters:  = 0:99;  = 0:75; b = 0:4; r = 0:9; and  = 0:995.
18The lower bound of  for  () > 1, found in Proposition 1, is very small when  has a vlaue close to
one. At the benchmark parameterization, the lower bound is less than 0:0001, which is not restrictive at all.
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Figure 2: The response of ination to a one percentage point increase in the ination target
under the AMPF regime.
response to favorable demand shocks and decreases in response to favorable supply shocks.
This is a conventional result under the AMPF regime. Equation (1) implies that a positive
r^t increases output gap for a given level of expected output gap and the real interest rate.
Then from Equation (2) it is clear that this in turn increases ination and expected ination
in equilibrium.
We next assess how this response depends on the monetary policy stance.
Proposition 4 (Magnitude of ination response and monetary policy stance) When
monetary policy is active and scal policy is passive (AMPF), ination responds less to non-
policy shocks as the monetary authority becomes more aggressive that is,   decreases as 
increases:
@  ()
@
< 0:
We therefore show that greater the systematic response of monetary policy to ination,
lower will be the response of ination to non-policy shocks. As  increases, under active mon-
etary policy, expected ination gets damped down more. Since this decreases the response
of the ex ante real interest rate, ination will increase by a lower amount in equilibrium.
Finally, because of the forward-looking nature of the model variables, it is straightforward
to establish a result regarding the variance of ination in response to non-policy shocks.
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Proposition 5 (Unconditional variance) When monetary policy is active and scal pol-
icy is passive (AMPF), the unconditional variance of ination decreases in :
@V ARNP (^t)
@
< 0,
where V ARNP () denotes the unconditional (long-run) variance associated with non-policy
shocks only (i.e. the inuence of policy shifts by the government is shut down: ";t = 0).
The proposition thus establishes that the long-run variance of ination in this policy
regime decreases when the monetary authority reacts systematically strongly to ination.
The two previous propositions have essentially the same implication: As the central bank
responds more strongly to the ination gap, the volatility of ination due to non-policy
shocks decreases.
Again, we illustrate these results in Figure 3. It shows the response of ination to non-
policy shocks under three di¤erent values of  and clearly illustrates our analytical ndings.
In addition, we can see that the response of ination decays at a much faster rate here than
in Figure 2. The reason for this is straightforward. As should be clear from Equation (8), the
response of ination to a shock to each of the exogenous processes aside from the size of
the response is entirely dictated by the response of the respective exogenous process itself.
Therefore, to the extent that the ination target is more persistent than other exogenous
variables ( > r), ination should return to its steady state level more slowly in response
to ination target shocks.
Our results raise an interesting point. Empirical studies in the recent DSGE literature
such as Cogley, Primiceri and Sargent (2010) have found that the low-frequency components
of the ination rate are explained almost entirely by a time-varying ination target. Our
analytical analysis however suggests that xing  to a large value is necessary for this well-
established nding. The nding is not obtained without such a tight restriction in modeling
and estimation. Figure 4 compares the response of ination to the ination target shock with
the response to the non-policy shock. For a more direct comparison, we have normalized the
initial responses to one. We can clearly see that the ination target relative to other shocks
dominates ination dynamics, especially in the long run. As discussed above, however,
this result is entirely due to the fact that we x  at a higher value than r. If we instead
treated all shocks symmetrically (i.e.  = r), the model would not distinguish between the
two shocks with respect to ination dynamics, as can be seen from Figure 4.
We now move on to analyzing another policy regime combination that leads to a determi-
nate equilibrium. As we will see, the results related to the correlation between the ination
target and the comparative statics on monetary policy response parameters will be in stark
13
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Figure 3: The response of ination to a one percentage point increase in the non-policy shock
under the AMPF regime.
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contrast in this case compared to the active monetary and passive scal policy regime.
2.3.2 Passive Monetary and Active Fiscal Policy
Under a passive monetary and active scal policy regime, we can express the solution for
ination as:
^t = 
(;  ) b^t 1    (;  ) ^t +   (;  ) r^t ; (9)
where 
 (;  ) ;  (;  ) ; and   (;  ) are functions of both the monetary policy response
parameter  and the scal policy response parameter  .19 Note that in this policy regime, as
Equation (9) makes clear, the dynamics of ination depend on public debt outstanding b^t 1
as well. This implies that there is an endogenous state variable in this case, which in turn
imparts endogenous dynamics to the model. These are extremely important di¤erences from
the case we analyzed in the previous section where monetary policy was active and scal
policy was passive.
We next characterize several properties of the solution.
Proposition 6 (Direction of ination response) When scal policy is su¢ cientlyac-
tive and monetary policy is passive (PMAF), ination moves in the opposite direction in
response to a change in the ination target that is,
 (;  )  0 for
 1 <  <   and 0   < 1; (10)
where 0 <    1   is a reduced-form parameter. The equality holds when  = 0.
This result, which is in stark contrast to Proposition 1 under the AMPF regime, arises
because now changes in the value of government debt inuences ination dynamics. Consider
a negative shock to the ination target. From Equation (3), this increases the nominal
interest rate on impact. An increase in the nominal interest rate results in an increase of the
outstanding value of government debt. In this active scal policy regime, since taxes do not
adjust by enough, the increase in the value of government debt leads to a positive wealth
e¤ect on households who hold government debt. This positive wealth e¤ect then leads to
higher spending, which pushes up ination. Proposition 6 is therefore, the key result behind
the negative relationship between ination and the ination target under the PMAF regime
shown in Figure 1. The wealth e¤ect on households due to changes in the value of government
19The complete solution, including the solution for debt, is provided in the appendix.
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debt and taxes, which in turn a¤ects householdsspending, is the main mechanism behind
our results in this section.
Now let us consider a comparative static exercise with respect to the monetary policy
parameter .
Proposition 7 (Magnitude of ination response and monetary policy stance) When
scal policy is su¢ cientlyactive and monetary policy is passive (PMAF), ination deviates
even further from the ination target when the monetary authority is more aggressive that
is,  increases in  in the domain of [0; 1):
@ (;  )
@
> 0 for
 1 <  <   and 0   < 1;
where 0 <    1   is a reduced-form parameter.
In sharp contrast to our result under the AMPF policy regime, here, as the reaction
of monetary policy to ination increases, so does the equilibrium impact on ination of the
ination target shock. The mechanism is as follows. When the reaction of monetary policy to
ination increases, then for a given decrease in the ination target, the interest rate increase
will be higher. This means that the outstanding value of government debt increases by more,
which in turn, increases the size of the wealth e¤ect discussed above. This then implies a
greater e¤ect on spending, and thereby, on ination. Thus, unless the monetary authority
decides to respond to ination by enough such that monetary policy moves from a passive
regime to an active regime and at the same time scal policy moves from an active regime
to a passive regime, a stronger response of monetary policy to ination ends up stabilizing
ination by less.
In this regime, since scal policy also matters for ination dynamics, we next establish a
result related to the scal policy stance.
Proposition 8 (Magnitude of ination response and scal policy stance) When mon-
etary policy is passive and scal policy is active (PMAF), ination deviates even further from
the ination target as the scal authority becomes more active  that is,  increases as  
decreases in the domain of ( 1; 1  ):
@ (;  )
@ 
< 0 for
 1 <  < 1   and 0   < 1:
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Figure 5: The response of ination to a one percentage decrease in the ination target under
the PMAF regime.
Here, as scal policy becomes more active, we see that ination will respond more strongly,
and in the opposite direction, to changes in the ination target. This result arises because as
 decreases, taxes respond less strongly to debt as given by Equation (4). Then the wealth
e¤ect due to interest rate changes described above becomes amplied. This increased wealth
e¤ect in turn leads to greater spending and thereby a stronger response of ination.
As an illustration, we show in Figure 5 the responses of ination to a one percent increase
in the ination target shock under varying degrees of monetary and scal policy stances to
ination and debt. The gure highlights our theoretical results above. In addition, it shows
that although our theoretical ndings are focused on the impact response of ination, the
same economic intuition can be extended to longer horizons. Indeed, it clearly shows that
the deviation of ination from the target continues to be greater in periods following the
shock, as monetary and scal policies become more active. The reason is that when  is
higher (and/or  is lower), the interest rate will be persistently higher after a negative shock
to the ination target to the extent that the ination target is persistent. This in turn
leads to persistently higher value of public debt. This then leads to a persistently positive
wealth e¤ect, which in turn, leads to a persistently higher ination. What is more, when
monetary and/or scal policy is more active, ination depends more strongly on government
indebtedness  that is, as shown below in a proposition, 
 (;  ) is increasing in  and
decreasing in  . This property obviously magnies the mechanism through which higher
debt inuences the dynamics of ination.
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We now move on to analyzing the response of ination to the non-policy shock.
Proposition 9 (Direction of ination response) When monetary policy is passive and
scal policy is active (PMAF), ination moves in the same directions in response to the
non-policy shock, r^t that is,
  (;  )  0 for
 1 <  < 1   and 0   < 1: (11)
The equality holds when  = 0.
This proposition under the PMAF policy regime is the same as Proposition 3 under the
AMPF policy regime. That is, ination moves in the same direction as the natural rate of
interest. Thus ination increases in response to a positive demand shock while it decreases
in response to a positive supply shock. This is because even under the PMAF policy regime,
the e¤ect of the non-policy shock on the economy is still to increase the output gap given the
expectations as implied by Equation (1), and in turn, ination as implied by Equation (2).
The comparative statics of ination responses with respect to the monetary policy stance
however, is dramatically di¤erent in the PMAF regime compared to the AMPF regime, as
we establish next.
Proposition 10 (Magnitude of ination response and monetary policy stance) When
monetary policy is passive and scal policy is active (PMAF), ination responds more to non-
policy shocks as the monetary authority becomes more aggressive that is,   increases as 
increases in the domain of [0; 1):
@  (;  )
@
> 0 for
 1 <  < 1   and 0   < 1:
Thus, the stronger the systematic response of monetary policy to ination, the greater
will be the response of ination to the non-policy shocks in equilibrium. Why is this the
case? When a positive r^t shock hits the economy, it raises ination. Now with a higher ,
interest rates will rise by more in response to this increase in ination, as given by Equation
(3). Under the AMPF policy regime, this increase in interest rates would bring expected
ination down. In this PMAF regime, however, the greater increase in interest rates raises
the outstanding value of government debt by a greater amount. As we have explained before,
this leads to a greater wealth e¤ect on the households, which increases ination by a larger
amount.
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Figure 6: The response of ination to a one percentage increase in the non-policy shock
under the PMAF regime.
We next conduct a similar comparative static exercise with respect to the stance of scal
policy.
Proposition 11 (Magnitude of ination response and scal policy stance) When mon-
etary policy is passive and scal policy is active (PMAF), ination responds less in response
to non-policy shocks as the scal authority becomes more active that is,   decreases as  
decreases in the domain of ( 1; 1  ):
@  (;  )
@ 
> 0 for
 1 <  < 1   and 0   < 1:
This proposition shows that the weaker is the response of taxes to debt, the lower is the
response of ination to the non-policy shock. When a positive r^t hits the economy, as we
discussed above, it leads to higher ination. This lowers the outstanding value of government
debt. From the scal policy rule (4) this implies that taxes will decrease. Now the lower is  ,
the smaller is the decrease in taxes. Even though taxes are lump-sum in our model, when the
regime is PMAF, tax changes lead to a wealth e¤ect on households. With a smaller decrease
in taxes, the wealth e¤ect is smaller, which in turn leads to a smaller change in spending and
thereby ination.
Figure 6 illustrates our results on ination response to non-policy shocks under varying
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degrees of monetary and scal policy reactions to ination and debt respectively. The gure
highlights our analytical results above on the impact response of ination. Higher  or a
higher  leads to a greater initial impact of ination. In addition to the initial impact, the
dynamic responses of ination reveal an interesting pattern that is di¤erent from the case
under AMPF. While the initial response of ination is positive in response to the shock
r^t and it remains positive for a number of periods, after some time, ination goes below
steady state. The intuition for this result is again related to the dynamics of government
debt. Initially, the increase in ination lowers the outstanding value of government debt. In
this regime, this decrease in the value of government debt leads to a negative wealth e¤ect on
households. This negative wealth e¤ect leads to a decrease in spending by households, which
in turn, eventually leads to ination decreasing and going below steady state. Moreover, note
that while analyzing the dynamic response of ination under di¤erent values of ; one sees
that the paths intersect after a certain number of periods. This feature arises because when
ination goes below steady state, it leads to a decrease in nominal interest rates, as given
by Equation (3). This decrease in interest rate leads to a negative wealth e¤ect. Higher the
value of ; greater is this negative wealth e¤ect. Thus, once ination goes below steady state,
due to the negative wealth e¤ect that depresses spending, there is a tendency for ination to
continue below steady for a while. This e¤ect is more pronounced when  is higher, which
in turn, implies that the paths for di¤erent levels of  will cross.
Figure 7 shows results for the ination response to non-policy shocks under varying de-
grees of monetary policy reaction to ination and for di¤erent levels of persistence of the
non-policy shocks. As is to be expected, the greater the persistence of the shock, the more
persistent will be the response of ination. Moreover, the pattern of ination initially re-
maining above steady state and then eventually going below steady state is robust to various
levels of persistence of the shock.
The results on the dynamic responses of ination have an important implication for the
relationship between the monetary policy stance and the volatility of ination a primary
policy objective of central banks. Due to endogenous dynamics under this policy regime, we
are unable to provide closed form expressions for the variance of ination. We thus resort to
numerical illustrations. As Figure 6 illustrates, under PMAF, while the response of ination
deviation is not greater for every time period when  is higher, it is certainly the case for
most periods especially the initial period. To the extent that initial responses of ination to
shocks dominate in the second moment of ination dynamics, the volatility of ination will
be larger when monetary policy reaction is stronger.20 Figure 8 illustrates this result. Under
20Initial responses are disproportionately important for the variance of the ination rate because the
squared size of the initial response to a shock is substantially bigger than those of the responses in the
following periods as can be seen clear in Figure 7. This argument is reminiscent of the di¤erence in outcomes
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Figure 7: The response of ination to a one percentage point increase in the non-policy shock
with di¤erent degrees of persistence under the PMAF regime.
AMPF, a more hawkish monetary policy leads to a smaller standard deviation of ination
as proved earlier. Under PMAF, however, a stronger monetary policy reaction to ination
instead leads to a higher volatility of ination.
We next provide some properties of the solution related to the response of ination to
public debt outstanding. Note again that this feature of the solution is unique to the passive
monetary and active scal policy regime (PMAF).
Proposition 12 (Direction of ination response) When scal policy is active and mon-
etary policy is passive (PMAF), ination moves in the same direction in response to a change
in public debt outstanding that is,

 (;  ) > 0 for
 1 <  < 1   and 0   < 1:
Thus, ination is a¤ected positively by changes in public debt outstanding in this regime.
This result is again a direct derivative of the wealth e¤ect on households that is a crucial
mechanism under active scal policy. A higher level of public debt outstanding will increase
the extent of wealth e¤ect of changes in the value of public debt. This then changes spending
when monetary policy is analyzed under commitment and under discretion, also known as the stabilization
bias.
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Figure 8: Standard deviation of ination (in percent) across di¤erent values of  conditional
on the non-policy shocks under the PMAF regime. The standard deviation of the non-policy
shock is normalized to one percent.
and thereby, ination by a greater extent. We now conduct comparative static exercises with
respect to the monetary policy and scal policy parameters.
Proposition 13 (Magnitude of ination response and monetary policy stance) When
scal policy is su¢ ciently active and monetary policy is passive (PMAF), ination re-
sponds more to a change in public debt outstanding when the monetary authority is more
aggressive that is, 
 increases as  increases in the domain of [0; 1):
@
 (;  )
@
> 0 for
 1 <  <   and 0   < 1;
where   is a positive reduced-form parameter that lies between 0 and 1    (i.e. 0 <   
1  ).
Proposition 14 (Magnitude of ination response and scal policy stance) When s-
cal policy is active and monetary policy is passive (PMAF), ination responds more to a
change in public debt outstanding when the scal authority is more active that is, 
 de-
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creases as  decreases in the domain of ( 1; 1  ):
@
 (;  )
@ 
< 0 for
 1 <  < 1   and 0   < 1:
The rst of the propositions above thus shows that a greater systematic response of
interest rates to ination lead to a greater response of ination to public debt outstanding.
Again, this result arises because with a stronger response of interest rates to ination, the
wealth e¤ect on households of changes in the value of outstanding government debt gets
amplied. The result of the second proposition arises also because the wealth e¤ect gets
magnied when taxes respond less to public debt outstanding.
Finally, we consider the case where there is equilibrium indeterminacy as both monetary
and scal policies are passive.
2.3.3 Passive Monetary and Passive Fiscal Policy
Under a passive monetary and passive scal policy regime (PMPF), multiple equilibria exist.
We can express the solution for ination as:
^t =

e2^t 1 + 


b  
 1
e1   

^t 1  

 1
e1   r

r^t 1 + 


b^t 1   e2b^t 2

| {z }
Et 1^t
+
h
m mr
i " ";t
"r;t
#
+ t;
where t is a sunspot shock.
21 By decomposing the expectational error ^t   Et 1^t into the
innovations to the fundamental shocks, ";t and "r;t, and the sunspot shock, t, we maintain
that the sunspot shock is independent of the fundamental shocks to the economy. Note that
parameters m and mr are not uniquely determined in this solution.
It is easy to see that the relationship between ^t and ^

t and the e¤ect of r^

t on ^t is
ambiguous. For example, ^t and ^

t may be positively or negatively related. If agents form
self-fullling expectations that a shock to ^t decreases ination signicantly (m << 0),
then the self-fullling expectations can dominate and ination can respond negatively to
a shock to ^t . But, in general, the question of how ^t responds to ^

t can be answered
only empirically. The answer will depend the numerical values of non-structural as well as
21For the complete description of the notation, see the appendix.
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structural parameters. In their estimated model, Bhattarai, Lee, and Park (2012) nd that
the ination target is not a signicant driving force of ination dynamics under the PMPF
regime, as depicted in Figure 1.
3 Quantitative Model
In this section, we assess whether the results found analytically with the simple model in the
previous sections also hold in a quantitative model. We use a standard medium-scale DSGE
model that features a rich set of frictions and shocks along the lines of Smets and Wouters
(2007), Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2007), and Justiniano, Primiceri, and
Tambalotti (2010). We lay out the basic model features below while providing a complete
description in the appendix. The main actors and their decision problems are as follows.
3.1 Description
3.1.1 Households
Households, a continuum in the unit interval, face an innite horizon problem and maximize
expected discounted utility over consumption and leisure. The utility function is additively
separable over consumption and labor e¤ort. There is time-varying external habit formation
in consumption and a discount factor shock. Households own capital that they rent to
rms. The model features variable capital utilization rate, which is chosen optimally by
households. Households also make capital accumulation decision, and in doing so, take into
account capital adjustment costs. There is a investment shock in the capital accumulation
equation that leads to a variation in the e¢ ciency with which the consumption good is
converted into capital.
Each household is a monopolistic supplier of di¤erentiated labor. The elasticity of substi-
tution over the di¤erentiated labor varieties is time-varying. A large number of competitive
employment agencies combine the di¤erentiated labor services into a homogeneous labor in-
put that is sold to rms. Each household enjoys some monopoly power over setting wages,
which are sticky in nominal terms. Wage stickiness is modelled following Calvo (1983). There
is a constant probability of not adjusting wages every period, with wages that do not adjust
partially indexed to past ination.
3.1.2 Firms
Firms, a continuum in the unit interval, produce di¤erentiated goods using the homogenous
labor input and capital. The elasticity of substitution over the di¤erentiated goods varieties
24
is time-varying. There is a xed cost in production, which ensures zero prots in steady-
state. The production function, which takes a Cobb-Douglas form, is subject to an aggregate
neutral technology shock. Each rms enjoys some monopoly power over setting prices, which
are sticky in nominal terms. Price stickiness is modelled following Calvo (1983). There is
a constant probability of not adjusting prices every period, with prices that do not adjust
partially indexed to past ination.
3.1.3 Government
The government is subject to a ow budget constraint and conducts monetary and scal
policies using endogenous feedback rules. For simplicity, we assume that the government
issues only one-period nominal debt and levies lump-sum taxes. The government controls
the one-period nominal interest rate. Monetary policy is modeled using an interest rate rule
that features interest rate smoothing and a systematic response of the nominal interest rate
to the deviation of ination from a time-varying target and the deviation of output from the
natural level of output.22 Monetary policy shock is the non-systematic component of this
policy rule. Fiscal policy is modelled using a tax rule that features a systematic response
of the tax revenues to the level of outstanding government debt. Government spending-to-
output ratio evolves exogenously as a time-varying fraction of output.
3.2 Approximate Model
We rst solve the problem of households and rms given the monetary and scal policy rules
and derive the equilibrium conditions. We then use approximation methods to solve the
model. First, the model features a stochastic balanced growth path since the neutral tech-
nology shock contains a unit root. Therefore, we de-trend variables on the balanced growth
path by the level of the technology shock and write down all the equilibrium conditions of the
transformed model. Second, we compute the non-stochastic steady state of this transformed
model. Third, we obtain a rst-order approximation of the equilibrium conditions around
this steady state. We then solve the approximated model using standard methods. The
approximated equations are provided in the appendix.
As in the simple model, the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium depends crucially
on the prevailing monetary and scal policy regime. The equilibrium of the economy will
be determinate either if monetary policy is active while scal policy is passive (the AMPF
regime) or if monetary policy is passive while scal policy is active (the PMAF regime).
22The natural level of output is the output that would prevail under exible wages and prices and in the
absence of time-variation in the elasticity of substitution over the di¤erent varieties of labor and goods.
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An equilibrium is indeterminate and multiple equilibria exist if both monetary and scal
policies are passive (the PMPF regime). In this richer model, we are unable to analytically
characterize the exact parameter boundaries that lead to active and passive policies. We
therefore determine the boundaries numerically.
3.3 Results
The results from this quantitative model are consistent with our analytical results, as we
discuss below in detail.23 We will present results with respect to the ination target shock and
six non-policy shocks: neutral technology shock, government spending, investment specic
technology shock, price markup shock, wage markup shock, and a preference shock.
3.3.1 Parameter Values
Our model, other than a slightly di¤erent specication of monetary policy rule and an inclu-
sion of a scal block, is the same as in Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2007),
and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010).24 For our numerical exercises, we use the
posterior median estimates of Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010) for all the para-
meters related to preferences and technology. For all three policy regimes, we also use the
same value as their posterior median estimates for the monetary policy feedback parameter
on output gap. For the tax smoothing parameter in the scal policy rule we use the posterior
estimate of Bhattarai, Lee, and Park (2012) while for the steady state level of the maturity
value of debt-to-output, we use the sample average from U.S. data. We then conduct several
comparative static exercises with respect to the policy feedback parameters on ination and
debt outstanding to show that the numerical results from this model are consistent with our
analytical results from the simple model. All the parameter values that we use are provided
in the appendix.
3.3.2 Ination Target Shock
Panels (a)-(d) of Figure 9 show for the three policy regimes the impulse response of ination
to an exogenous change in the ination target, varying the degree of monetary policy stance.
They clearly illustrate one of the main results of our paper: under AMPF, actual ination
moves in the same direction as the ination target and that higher the systematic response
of monetary policy to ination, lower is the gap between ination and the ination target,
23There are a two cases of di¤erences with respect to the intial impact on ination, for which we provide
detailed explanations.
24The main di¤erences in the monetary policy rule specication is that we include a time-varying ination
target while excluding the growth rate of the output gap.
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while under PMAF, in sharp contrast, actual ination moves in an opposite direction from the
ination target and higher is the systematic response of monetary policy to ination, higher
is the gap between ination and the ination target. Moreover, under PMPF, depending on
the value of the parameter M ; which governs how self-fullling beliefs are formed under
indeterminacy, ination could either move in the same direction as the ination target or in
an opposite direction. Finally, under PMAF, panel (e) of Figure 9 shows that lower is the
response of taxes to debt, greater is the gap between ination and the ination target.
3.3.3 Non-policy Shocks
Figure 10 shows under AMPF the impulse response of ination to six non-policy shocks,
varying the degree of monetary policy stance. It is clear that ination responds less on
impact to a non-policy shock when the systematic response of monetary policy to ination is
higher for all cases, except for the investment specic technology shock. Even for this shock
however, after 5 periods or so, the response is lower for a greater : In our simple model,
where we abstract from investment, this shock is not present. In this quantitative model,
the initial response of ination is higher for a greater  because this shock directly and
signicantly a¤ects the capital rental cost for rms. Thus, when  is greater, it can be the
case that the rise in marginal cost due to a positive investment specic shock outweighs the
usual ination stabilization e¤ect, thereby leading to a greater response of ination. This
result however, depends on all the other parameters of the model, in particular, the extent
of wage stickiness in the economy. This is because wage stickiness determines the dynamics
of wages, an important component of marginal cost. In fact in the appendix, in an alternate
parameterization, we show a case where ination responds less on impact to this shock with a
greater ; which makes it completely consistent with our analytical results. In this alternate
parameterization, we decrease the extent of wage stickiness compared to the baseline case
presented here, which magnies the ination stabilization e¤ect of monetary policy on wage
costs and, thereby, damps down the increase in ination following an investment specic
shock.
Figure 11 shows under PMAF the impulse response of ination to six non-policy shocks,
varying the degree of monetary policy stance. It is clear that for all cases and in sharp contrast
to AMPF, ination responds more on impact to a non-policy shock when the systematic
response of monetary policy to ination is higher.
Figure 12 shows under PMAF the impulse response of ination to six non-policy shocks,
varying the degree of scal policy stance It is clear that ination responds less on impact to
a non-policy shock when the systematic response of scal policy to debt is lower for all cases,
except for the neutral technology shock. This result is di¤erent from our analytical results in
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Figure 9: The response of ination to a one percentage decrease in the ination target.
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Figure 10: The response of ination to a one standard deviation increase in the non-policy
shock under AMPF.
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Figure 11: The response of ination to a one standard deviation increase in the non-policy
shock under PMAF.
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the simple model. The reason is that this quantitative model features stochastic growth and
the technology shock is therefore a shock to the growth rate as opposed to a shock to the
level of technology, which was the case in the simple model. Thus, due to this, the shock can
signicantly a¤ect the dynamics of ination as it plays a prominent role in the government
budget constraint.
To preserve space, we do not present impulses responses under PMPF as the results clearly
depend on the calibration of M : We now move on to presenting results on the volatility of
ination. This is especially pertinent because arguably, focusing on the volatility of ination
is a more sensible metric for ination dynamics in this quantitative model which features
various adjustment costs and internal propagation mechanisms. Figure 13 shows under the
three policy regimes the standard deviation of ination, varying the degree of monetary policy
stance. Here we present the standard deviation of ination when all six non-policy shocks
hit the economy. Panels (a) and (b) clearly depict one of the main results of our paper: in
response to non-policy shocks under AMPF, ination volatility decreases as monetary policy
responds strongly to ination, while in sharp contrast, under PMAF, ination volatility
increases.25 In this particular parameterization, panel (c) shows that under PMPF, ination
volatility increases when monetary policy responds strongly to ination.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we characterize the dynamics of ination under di¤erent monetary and scal
regime combinations in a standard DSGE model. First, using a simple set-up that allows for
closed-form solutions, we show that answers to some classic questions on ination dynamics
depend crucially on the prevailing policy regime. Second, we show that our insights continue
to hold in a richer quantitative model.
Our results show that under an active monetary and passive scal policy regime, ination
closely follows the path of the ination target and a stronger reaction of monetary policy
to ination decreases the response of ination to shocks. This is the usual case studied in
the literature and the results are standard since in this regime, monetary policy has control
over ination. In sharp contrast, under an active scal and passive monetary policy regime,
ination moves in an opposite direction from the ination target and a stronger reaction of
25Note that ination is extremely volatile under PMAF. This is mostly because of the e¤ect of government
spending shocks in this regime. Government spending shocks have a direct impact on the government budget
constraint and thereby, require extremely volatile movements in ination for debt stabilization. Moreover,
note that since we use parameter values from a model estimated under AMPF, ination volatility under
PMAF is perhaps unreasonably high. Therefore, the main point of this exercise is simply to show how the
volatility of ination depends on the monetary policy reaction function parameter within a policy regime,
rather than a direct comparison of the volatility of ination across policy regimes.
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Figure 12: The response of ination to a one standard deviation increase in the non-policy
shock under PMAF.
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Figure 13: Standard deviation of ination across di¤erent values of  conditional on the
non-policy shocks.
monetary policy to ination increases the response of ination to shocks. These e¤ects arise
crucially because of the prevalence of a wealth e¤ect in response to interest rate movements
that change the value of government debt. In particular, an increase in interest rate, because
of a positive wealth e¤ect, increases spending, and thereby ination. Moreover, in this
case, a weaker response of scal policy to debt decreases the response of ination to shocks.
Finally, under a passive monetary and passive scal policy regime, because of equilibrium
indeterminacy, theory provides no clear answer on the behavior of ination, which can only
be ascertained by estimating the model.
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Appendix
A Simple Model
A.1 Households
Identical households choose sequences of fCt; Bt; Nt; Dt+1g to solve:
maxE0
1X
t=0
tdt

logCt   N
1+'
t
1 + '

subject to
PtCt +Bt + Et [Qt;t+1Dt+1] = Rt 1Bt 1 +Dt +WtNt +t   Pt t;
where Ct is consumption, Nt is labor hours, Pt is the price level, Bt is the amount of one-
period risk-less nominal government bond, Rt is the gross nominal interest rate, Wt is the
nominal wage rate, t is prots of intermediate rms, and  t is government taxes net of
transfers. The parameter, '  0, denotes the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply,
while dt represents an intertemporal preference shock. In addition to the government bond,
households trade at time t one-period state-contingent nominal securities Dt+1at price Qt;t+1.
A.2 Firms
Perfectly competitive rms produce the nal good, Yt, by assembling intermediate goods,
Yt(i), through a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) technology Yt =
R 1
0
Yt(i)
 1
 di
 
 1
, where  > 1
denotes the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The corresponding price
index for the nal consumption good is Pt =
R 1
0
Pt(i)
1 di
 1
1 
, where Pt(i) is the price of
the intermediate good i. The optimal demand for Yt(i) is given by Yt(i) = (Pt(i)=Pt)
  Yt.
Monopolistically competitive rms produce intermediate goods using the production func-
tion, Yt(i) = atNt(i), whereNt(i) denotes the labor hours employed by rm i and at represents
exogenous economy-wide productivity. Prices are sticky as in Calvo. A rm adjusts its price,
Pt(i), with probability 1  each period, to maximize the present discounted value of future
prots:
Et
1X
k=0
kQt;t+k

Pt(i)  Wt+k
At+k

Yt+k(i):
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A.3 Government
Each period, the government collects lump-sum tax revenues  t and issues one-period nominal
bonds Bt to nance its consumption Gt, and interest payments. Accordingly, the ow budget
constraint is given by:
Bt
Pt
= Rt 1
Bt 1
Pt
+Gt    t:
For simplicity, we assume Gt = 0, which is inconsequential for our theoretical results. The
ow budget constraint can be rewritten as:
R 1t bt = bt 1
1
t
   t;
where bt  Rt BtPt denotes the real maturity value of government debt.
The monetary and scal policies are described by simple rules. The monetary authority
responds to deviations of the ination rate from its time-varying target rate, t , by setting
the nominal interest rate according to:
Rt
R
=

t
t

;
where R is the steady-state value of Rt. Similarly, the scal authority sets the tax revenues
according to:
 t

=

bt 1
b
 
;
where  and b are respectively the steady state value of  t and bt.
A.4 Approximate Model
We log-linearize the equilibrium conditions around non-stochastic steady state values:

; Y ; R; b; 
	
.
Since the log-linearized model is completely standard, we omit a detailed derivation. The
approximate model is characterized by the following equations:
Y^t = EtY^t+1  

R^t   Et^t+1

  Et[d^t+1];
^t = 

Y^t   Y^ nt

+ Et^t+1;
R^t =  (^t   ^t ) ;
^ t =  b^t 1;
b^t = 
 1b^t 1    1b^t    1^ t +bR^t:
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In the equations above, we use X^t to denote the log deviation of a variable Xt from its
steady state X (X^t = lnXt   ln X), except for two scal variables, b^t and ^ t. Following
Woodford (2003), we let them represent respectively the deviation of the maturity value of
government debt and of government tax revenues (net of transfers) from their steady-state
levels, measured as a percentage of steady-state output: b^t = bt 
b
Y
and ^ t =  t Y . In our
simple model, (the log-deviation of) the natural level of output and the slope of the Phillips
curve are respectively given as Y^ nt = a^t and  =
(1 )(1 )

.
The model can be reduced to a dynamic system of
n
^t; b^t; ~Yt
o
:
~Yt = Et ~Yt+1    (^t   ^t ) + Et^t+1 + r^t ;
^t =  ~Yt + Et^t+1; (12)
b^t = 
 1(1   )b^t 1   b
 
 1    ^t   b^t ;
where ~Yt  Y^t  Y^ nt represents the output gap and r^t is a linear combination of all non-policy
shocks (of both supply and demand types). It is often referred to as the natural rate of
interest because it is the real interest rate that would prevail under exible prices. In our
simple model, it is specically given as:
r^t = Et [a^t+1]  Et[d^t+1]:
Note that demand-type shocks raise r^t , while supply-type shocks lower r^

t .
B Solution of the Simple Model
In this section, we solve for the equilibrium time paths of
n
^t; b^t; ~Yt
o
given exogenous vari-
ables summarized by the policy and non-policy shocks, f^t ; r^t g. To this end, we assume the
exogenous random variables follow AR(1) processes:
^t = ^

t 1 + ";t;
r^t = rr^

t 1 + "r;t:
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We rst write (12) in state space form:0B@ 1 1 00  0
0 0 1
1CAEt
0B@ ~Yt+1^t+1
b^t
1CA =
0B@ 1  0  1 0
0  b   1     1(1   )
1CA
0B@ ~Yt^t
b^t 1
1CA
+
0B@    10 0
 b 0
1CA ^t
rt
!
(13)
We then pre-multiply
0B@ 1 1 00  0
0 0 1
1CA
 1
to both sides of the equation (13):
Et
0B@ ~Yt+1^t+1
b^t
1CA =
0B@ 
 1 + 1    1 0
  1  1 0
0  b   1     1(1   )
1CA
| {z }
=M
0B@ ~Yt^t
b^t 1
1CA+
0B@    10 0
 b 0
1CA ^t
r^t
!
The coe¢ cient matrix, M , can be decomposed as M = V DV  1, where D is a diagonal
matrix whose elements are the eigenvalues of M . The system then can be written as:
Et
0B@ ~Yt+1^t+1
b^t
1CA = V
0B@ e1 0 00 e2 0
0 0 e3
1CAV  1
0B@ ~Yt^t
b^t 1
1CA+
0B@    10 0
 b 0
1CA ^t
r^t
!
;
where
e1 =
1
2

 + + 1 +
q
( + + 1)2   4 (1 + )

e2 = 
 1(1   )
e3 =
1
2

 + + 1 
q
( + + 1)2   4 (1 + )

V =
0B@ v11 v12 v13v21 v22 v23
1 1 1
1CA and V  1 =
0B@ q11 q12 0q21 q22 1
q31 q32 0
1CA :
The elements of V and V  1 are nonlinear functions of the model parameters. For later use,
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we note that:
v23 =
2 (1   ) 

 + + 1 
q
( + + 1)2   4 (1 + )

2b (1  ) :
Finally, letting Xt 

x1;t x2;t x3;t
T
 V  1

~Yt ^t b^t 1
T
, we rewrite the system
as:
EtXt+1 =
0B@ e1 0 00 e2 0
0 0 e3
1CAXt +
0B@  q11  q11   q21 +b  q21
 q31  q31
1CA ^t
r^t
!
: (14)
Each element of Xt is given by:
x1;t = q11 ~Yt + q12^t;
x2;t = q21 ~Yt + q22^t + b^t 1;
x3;t = q31 ~Yt + q32^t:
B.1 Active Monetary and Passive Fiscal Policy
Under AMPF, e1 and e3 are outside the unit circle, while e2 is inside the circle. We thus
use the rst and third rows of the system (14) to draw linear restrictions between model
variables. Substituting out the future values of x1;t and x3;t recursively, we obtain:
x1;t =
1
e1
1X
k=0

1
e1
k
Etz

1;t+k; (15)
x3;t =
1
e3
1X
k=0

1
e3
k
Etz

3;t+k; (16)
where
z1;t = q11^

t + q11r^

t ;
z3;t = q31^

t + q31r^

t :
These equations imply:
Etz

1;t+k = q11
k
^

t + q11
k
r r^

t
Etz

3;t+k = q31
k
^

t + q31
k
r r^

t
40
Plugging these equations into (15) and (16), we obtain:
x1;t =
1
e1
1X
k=0

1
e1
k
Etz

1;t+k = q11
1
e1   
^t + q11
1
e1   r
r^t ;
x3;t =
1
e3
1X
k=0

1
e3
k
Etz

3;t+k = q31
1
e3   
^t + q31
1
e3   r
r^t ;
which leads to:
~Yt =  q12
q11
^t + 
1
e1   
^t +
1
e1   r
r^t
~Yt =  q32
q31
^t + 
1
e3   
^t +
1
e3   r
r^t
Since the above system has two equations and two endogenous variables, we can easily solve
for ^t and ~Yt. Moreover, ^t and ~Yt do not depend on b^t 1. We use the method of undetermined
coe¢ cients and obtain:
^t = () ^

t +   () r^

t
~Yt = 
Y () ^t +  
Y () r^t
where
 ()  
 (  ) + (1  ) (1  )
  ()  
 (  r) + (1  r) (1  r)
Y ()   (1  )
 (  ) + (1  ) (1  )
 Y ()  (1  r)
 (  r) + (1  r) (1  r)
:
B.2 Passive Monetary and Active Fiscal Policy
We consider the case in which  2 [0; 1) and  2
  1;   where   1    is the upper
bound for active scal policy. We then can show that e1 > 1, e2 > 1 and e3 2 (0; 1) in that
parameter space. Consequently the rst two rows in (14) provide linear restrictions. From
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the rows, we obtain:
x1;t =
1
e1
1X
k=0

1
e1
k
Etz

1;t+k; (17)
x2;t =
1
e2
1X
k=0

1
e2
k
Etz

2;t+k; (18)
where
z1;t = q11^

t + q11r^

t ;
z2;t = 
 
q21 +b

^t + q21r^

t :
The equations above imply:
Etz

1;t+k = q11
k
^

t + q11
k
r r^

t
Etz

2;t+k = 
 
q21 +b

k^

t + q21
k
r r^

t
Plugging these equations into (15) and (16), we obtain:
x1;t =
1
e1
1X
k=0

1
e1
k
Etz

1;t+k = q11
1
e1   
^t + q11
1
e1   r
r^t (19)
x2;t =
1
e2
1X
k=0

1
e2
k
Etz

2;t+k = 
 
q21 +b
 1
e2   
^t + q21
1
e2   r
r^t (20)
Equation (19) implies:
~Yt =  q12
q11
^t + 
1
e1   
^t +
1
e1   r
r^t (21)
We plug (21) into (20) to get:
q21

 q12
q11
^t + 
1
e1   
^t +
1
e1   r
rt

+ q22^t + b^t 1 = 
 
q21 +b
 1
e2   
^t + q21
1
e2   r
r^t
Solving for ^t, we obtain ^t as a function of state variables,
n
b^t 1; ^

t ; r

t
o
:
^t = 
b^t 1   

 
q21 +b
 1
e2   
  q21 1
e1   

^t + 
q21

1
e1   r
  1
e2   r

rt (22)
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where

 =
q11
q12q21   q11q22
q21 =
b (1  )
 2 + ( +   1)    (1  ) :
For further analysis, it is useful to express the coe¢ cients on the state variables in terms of
model parameters. To this end, we use the results in the following lemmas.
Lemma 1: 
 = (e2 e3)b(1 ) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 1: Note that
q13q21   q11q23
det (V  1)
= v23;
q11q22   q12q21
det (V  1)
= v33:
Therefore,
0 q21   q11 =  q11 = det
 
V  1
 v23;
q11q22   q12q21 = det
 
V  1
 v33 = det  V  1 1:
It follows that

 =
q11
q12q21   q11q22 = v23
=
2 (1   ) 

 + + 1 
q
( + + 1)2   4 (1 + )

2b (1  )
=
2 (1   )  2e3
2b (1  ) =
 (e2   e3)
b (1  ) > 0:
Lemma 2: 
q21 (e1   e2) =   1:
Proof of Lemma 2: We have

q21 (e1   e2) =  (e2   e3)b (1  )
b (1  )
 2 + ( +   1)    (1  ) (e1   e2)
= 
(e2   e3) (e1   e2)
 2 + ( +   1)    (1  ) = 
e1e2   e22   e1e3 + e2e3
 2 + ( +   1)    (1  )
= 
e2 (e1 + e3   e2)  e1e3
 2 + ( +   1)    (1  ) = 
(1  )(++ )
2
  e1e3
 2 + ( +   1)    (1  )
43
= 
(1  )(++ )
2
  1+

 2 + ( +   1)    (1  ) = 
1
2
[(1   ) ( + +  )     ]
 2 + ( +   1)    (1  )
=  1
   2 + ( +   1)    (1  )
 2 + ( +   1)    (1  ) =  
 1:
Using the results from these two lemmas, we can simplify (22) as:
^t = 
(;  ) b^t 1    (;  ) ^t +   (;  ) r^t (23)
where

 (;  )   (e2   e3)b (1  ) ;
 (;  )  (;  ) ; where (;  )  

b (e1   )   1
(e1   ) (e2   )
;
  (;  )  
 1
(e1   r) (e2   r)
:
It then follows that the low of motion for b^t is given as:
b^t = e3b^t 1   b

1    1    ^t   b   1    r^t :
B.3 Passive Monetary and Passive Fiscal Policy
Finally, we consider the case in which  2 [0; 1) and  2
 
 ;1. Then, only one root (e1)
is explosive and there will exist multiple solutions to the model.
Solution for x1;t is the same as in AMPF or PMAF
~Yt =  q12
q11
^t + 
1
e1   
^t +
1
e1   r
r^t
Plug the equation above into the equation for x2;t:
x2;t =   1


^t + 
q21
e1   
^t +
q21
e1   r
r^t + b^t 1
Note that
Etx2;t+1 =   1


Et^t+1 + 
q21
e1   
Et^

t+1 +
q21
e1   r
Etr^

t+1 + b^t
=   1


Et^t+1 + 
q21
e1   
^

t +
q21
e1   r
rr^

t + b^t;
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and therefore we can plug this into the di¤erence equation for x2;t as
Et^t+1 = e2^t + 


b  
 1
e1   

^t  

 1
e1   r

r^t + 


b^t   e2b^t 1

:
Now a solution to this equation can be characterized as
^t+1 =

e2^t + 


b  
 1
e1   

^t  

 1
e1   r

r^t + 


b^t   e2b^t 1

| {z }
Et^t+1
+
h
m mr
i " ";t+1
"r;t+1
#
+ t+1;
where "t+1 is a vector of fundamental shocks and t+1 is a sunspot shock.
C Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 Showing  ()  0 is straight forward since   0;  > ;
(1  ) > 0; and (1  ) > 0. In addition, it is straight forward to show:
 () > 1, for  >
(1  ) (1  )

:
Proof of Proposition 2 Take the partial derivative:
@ ()
@
=
  [   (1  ) (1  )]
[ (  ) + (1  ) (1  )]2
:
The denominator is always positive. Therefore, the sign of the numerator will determine the
sign of the derivative. We thus have:
@ ()
@
> 0, for 0   < (1  ) (1  )

@ ()
@
< 0, for  >
(1  ) (1  )

:
Proof of Proposition 3 Showing   ()  0 is straight forward since   0;  > r;
(1  r) > 0; and (1  r) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4 It is trivial.
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Proof of Proposition 5 This result follows directly from Propositions 3 and 4.
Proof of Proposition 6 Since   0, it su¢ ces to show (;  ) is positive. Let us rewrite
(;  ) by substituting out 
:
 =
 (e2   e3) (e1   )   1 (1  )
(e1   ) (e2   ) (1  )
=
 (e2   e3) (e1   e2 + e2   )   1 (1  )
(e1   ) (e2   ) (1  )
=
 (e2   e3) (e1   e2)   1 (1  ) +  (e2   e3) (e2   )
(e1   ) (e2   ) (1  )
=
  1


 2 + ( +   1)    (1  )  

(1  ) +  (e2   e3) (e2   )
(e1   ) (e2   ) (1  )
=
  1


 2 + ( +   1) +  (e2   e3) (e2   )
(e1   ) (e2   ) (1  )
Use  = 1  e2:
 =
  1


 2 + ( +   1) +  (e2   e3) (e2   )
(e1   ) (e2   ) (1  )
(24)
=
  1


(1  e2)2 + ( +   1) (1  e2)

+  (e2   e3) (e2   )
(e1   ) (e2   ) (1  )
=
2 (e2   e3) (e2   )  (1  e2)2   ( +   1) (1  e2)
 (e1   ) (e2   ) (1  )
=
2 (e22   (e3 + )e2 + e3) 
 
2e22   2e2 + 1
  ( +   1) + ( +   1) e2
 (e1   ) (e2   ) (1  )
=
2 (e3   (e3 + )e2) + 2e2   ( + ) + ( +   1) e2
 (e1   ) (e2   ) (1  )
=

2 (1  e3) +  (1  ) + 

e2 + 
2e3   ( + )
 (e1   ) (e2   ) (1  )
:
The denominator is unambiguously positive for all parameter values under PMAF. Thus 
will be positive if and only if the numerator is also positive. Note that the numerator is a
linear and increasing function of e2 because the slope is positive. This implies that  > 0
for su¢ ciently large e2 or su¢ ciently small  . It is straightforward to show that  > 0 if
and only if  1 <  <  .   is a reduced-form parameter that crucially depends on the
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slope of the Phillips curve and satises
 
  1  ( + )  
2e3
 (1  e3) + (1  ) + 
=
 +   2e3
 (e1   )
0 <  
  1  
lim
!1
 

= 0
lim
!0
 

= 1  :
Therefore, the interval of  that makes  positive  i.e. that makes the coe¢ cient on t
negative always contains zero (i.e. always includes the benchmark FTPL case). In addition,
the interval covers the AF region ( 1 <  <  ) almost entirely. The interval coincides
exactly with the entire AF region only when prices are fully sticky (i.e. when  = 0). In
intermediate cases, the upper bound for positive ,  , is positive, but is slightly below the
upper bound for AF,  .
Proof of Proposition 7 Let us rst consider @(; )
@
:
@(;  )
@
=
(
@

@
b (e1   )2 (e2   ) + @e1@ 
b (e1   ) (e2   )
 @e1
@
(e2   )


b (e1   )   1
 )
(e1   )2 (e2   )2
=
@

@
b (e1   )2 (e2   )  @e3@ (e2   ) 1
(e1   )2 (e2   )2
=
@

@
b (e1   )2   @e3@  1
(e1   )2 (e2   )
Now let us take the partial derivative of  (;  ) with respect to :
@ (;  )
@
 (;  ) + @(;  )
@
=

b (e1   )   1
(e1   ) (e2   )
+ 
@

@
b (e1   )2   @e3@  1
(e1   )2 (e2   )
=
(e2 e3)
(1 ) (e1   )2   (e1   ) 1 + @
@b (e1   )2   @e3@  1
(e1   )2 (e2   )
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Since the denominator is positive, @(; )
@
> 0 if and only if the numerator is positive that
is,
0 <
@ (;  )
@
()
0 <
 (e2   e3)
(1  ) (e1   )
2   (e1   ) 1 + 
@

@
b (e1   )2   
@e3
@
 1
()  (e2   e3)
(1  ) + 
@

@
b  
@e3
@
 1 + (e1   ) 1
(e1   )2
()  (e2   e3)
(1  ) + 
e2   e3   (1  ) @e3@
(1  )2 >
@e3
@
 1 + (e1   ) 1
(e1   )2
()  (e2   e3) 1
(1  )2 >
@e3
@
 1 + (e1   ) 1
(e1   )2
+

(1  )
@e3
@
() e2 > e3 + (1  )2
(
@e3
@
 1 + (e1   ) 1
(e1   )2
+

(1  )
@e3
@
)
()  < 1 
"
e3 + (1  )2
(
@e3
@
 1 + (e1   ) 1
(e1   )2
+

(1  )
@e3
@
)#
()  < 1 

e3 + (1  )2

 1
(e1   )
+
 1
(e1   e3)

 1
(e1   )2
+

(1  )

In sum,
@ (;  )
@
> 0()  <  
where
 
  1 

e3 + (1  )2

 1
(e1   )
+
 1
(e1   e3)

 1
(e1   )2
+

(1  )

lim
!1
 

= 0
lim
!0
 

= 1  :
It is straightforward to show that   is positive. First, suppose      or     .
We have already shown   > 0 and   > 0 above. Thus, it must be that   > 0. Suppose
instead      and     . In this case, if  <  , then(;  ) > 0 and @
(; )
@
> 0.
But, we can show from (24) that @(; )
@
> 0 at  = 0 if @
(; )
@
> 0, which implies @(; )
@
> 0
at  = 0. Since  <   is the su¢ cient and necessary condition, it should always contain
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zero. Therefore,   > 0.
Proof of Proposition 8 Take the partial derivative of  = (e2 e3)(e1 ) 
 1(1 )
(e1 )(e2 )(1 ) with
respect to e2:
@
@e2
=
 (e1   )2 (e2   ) (1  )  (e1   ) (1  )

 (e2   e3) (e1   )   1 (1  )

[(e1   ) (e2   ) (1  )]2
=
(e1   ) (1  )

 (e1   ) (e2   )   (e2   e3) (e1   ) +  1 (1  )

[(e1   ) (e2   ) (1  )]2
=
(e1   ) (1  )
[(e1   ) (e2   ) (1  )]2
g
where
g =  (e1   ) (e2   )   (e2   e3) (e1   ) +  1 (1  ) :
Since (e1 )(1 )
[(e1 )(e2 )(1 )]2
> 0, we focus on g, which can be written as:
g = 

2   (e1 + e3)  + e1e3

+  1 (1  ) :
Note that
e1 + e3 =
 + + 1

e1e3 =
+ 1

:
Using these, rewrite g and regard g as a function of  2 (0; 1) given other parameters:
g () = 
2
   ( + + 1)  + 1 +  1:
Note that g () is a convex and quadratic function of ; and
g (0) = 1 +  1 > g(1) = 
 
 1   1 > 0:
Moreover,
g0 (0) < 0 and g0 (1) < 0:
Therefore, it must be that g > 0 for  2 (0; 1),  2 (0; 1) and  2 [0;1). Hence,
@
@e2
=
(e1   ) (1  )
[(e1   ) (e2   ) (1  )]2
g > 0:
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This implies that
@
@ 
< 0 and
@
@ 
< 0,
because e2 is decreasing in  .
Proof of Proposition 9 It is straight forward.
Proof of Proposition 10 e2 > 1 and @e1@ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 11 e1 > 1 and @e2@ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 12 
 (;  )  (e2 e3)b(1 ) > 0 because e2 > e3 and 1 > .
Proof of Proposition 13 Take the partial derivative of 
 (;  ) with respect to :
@

@
=

b
e2   e3   (1  ) @e3@
(1  )2 =

b
h()
(1  )2 ;
where
h()  e2   e3   (1  ) @e3
@
:
Since b
1
(1 )2 is clearly positive,
@

@
and of h() must have the same sign. Note that
h() > 0() e2 > e3 + (1  ) @e3
@
() e2 > e3 + (1  ) @e3
@
() e2 > e3 + (1  ) 
 + + 1  2e3

* @e3
@
=

 + + 1  2e3 > 0

() e2 > e3 + (1  ) 
 (e1   e3)
() e2 > 
2e1e3   2e23 + (1  )
 (e1   e3)
() e2 >  +   
2e23
 (e1   e3)
()  < 1   +   
2e23
 (e1   e3)| {z }
 
=
 (e1   e3) 
 
 +   2e23

 (e1   e3)
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It remains to show that   is positive. Consider the numerator of  , g ()   (e1   e3)  
 +   2e23

. Given other parameters, g () has the smallest value at  = 1 because
g0 () < 0. Then
g (1) =  (e1   e3) 
 
 +   2e23

= 

+ 1

  1

    +   2
= (1  )2 > 0:
In addition, we can show that
lim
!1
 

= 0
lim
!0
 

= 1  .
Proof of Proposition 14 It is straight forward as @e2
@ 
< 0.
Discussion on  ,  ,   and   1   : Although the upper bounds,  ,   and
 
, generally have di¤erent values, they converge to the same numbers as the slope of
NKPC goes to innity and zero. In particular, all of them equal   1    the "true"
upper bound for AF when  = 0. However,  ,  ,   and  would be indistinguishable
in practice because  ,  ,   2 (0;  ] and  has a tiny value.
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D Quantitative Model
D.1 Households
There is a continuum of households in the unit interval. Each household specializes in the
supply of a particular type of labor. A household that supplies labor of type-j maximizes
the utility function:
E0
( 1X
t=0
tt
"
log
 
Cjt   Ct 1
 $ Hjt 1+'
1 + '
#)
;
where Hjt denotes the hours of type-j labor services, Ct is aggregate consumption, and C
j
t
is consumption of household j. The parameters ; '; and  are, respectively, the discount
factor, the inverse of the (Frisch) elasticity of labor supply, and the degree of external habit
formation, while t represents an intertemporal preference shock that follows:
t = 

t 1 exp(";t),
where ";t  i.i.d. N (0; 2).
Household js ow budget constraint is:
PtC
j
t+PtI
j
t+B
j
t+Et

Qt;t+1V
j
t+1

= Wt(j)H
j
t+V
j
t +Rt 1B
j
t 1+R
k
t ut K
j
t 1 Pta(ut) Kjt 1+t Tt;
where Pt is the price level, B
j
t is the amount of one-period risk-less nominal government bond
held by household j, Rt is the interest rate on the bond, Wt(j) is the nominal wage rate for
type-j labor, t denotes prots of intermediate rms, and Tt denotes government taxes.26
In addition to the government bond, households trade at time t one-period state-contingent
nominal securities V jt+1at price Qt;t+1, and hence fully insure against idiosyncratic risk.
Moreover, Ijt is investment, R
k
t is the rental rate of e¤ective capital ut K
j
t 1 where ut is
the variable capacity utilization rate, and a(ut) is the cost of capital utilization. In steady-
state, u = 1 and a(1) = 0: Moreover, in the rst-order approximation of the model, the only
parameter that matters for the dynamic solution of the model is the curvature   a
00
(1)
a0 (1) : The
capital accumulation equation is then given by:
Kjt = (1  d) Kjt 1 + t
 
1  S
 
Ijt
Ijt 1
!!
Ijt ;
26The budget constraint reects our assumptions that each household owns an equal share of all interme-
diate rms and receives the same amount of net lump-sum transfers from the government.
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where d is the depreciation rate and S(:) is the adjustment cost function. In steady-state,
S = S
0
= 0 and S
00
> 0: t represents an investment shock that follows:
t = 

t 1 exp(";t),
where ";t  i.i.d. N
 
0; 2

.
Each household monopolistically provides di¤erentiated labor. There are competitive
employment agencies that assemble these di¤erentiated labor into a homogenous labor input
that is sold to intermediate goods rms. The assembling technology is a Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) production technology Ht =
 R 1
0
H
j
l;t 1
l;t
t dj
! l;t
l;t 1
, where l;t denotes the time-varying
elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated labor. The corresponding wage index for the
homogenous labor input is Wt =
R 1
0
Wt(j)
1 l;tdj
 1
1 l;t and the optimal demand for Hjt is
given by Hjt = (Wt(j)=Wt)
 l;t Ht: The elasticity of substitution l;t follows:
l;t
l;t   1

=
 l
l   1
1 
l

l;t 1
l;t   1

l
exp("l;t   l"l;t 1)
where "l;t  i.i.d. N (0; 2l ).
As in Calvo (1983), each household resets its nominal wage optimally with probability
1   w every period. Households that do not optimize adjust their wages according to the
simple partial dynamic indexation rule:
Wt(j) =Wt 1(j) [t 1at 1]
w [a]1 w ;
where w measures the extent of indexation and  is the steady-state value of the gross ina-
tion rate t  Pt=Pt 1. All optimizing households choose a common wage W t to maximize
the present discounted value of future utility:
Et
1X
k=0
kw
k
"
 t+k
 
Hjt+k
1+'
1 + '
+ t+kW

t H
j
t+k
#
where t+k is the marginal utility of nominal income.
D.2 Firms
The nal good Yt, which is consumed by the government and households as well as used to
invest, is produced by perfectly competitive rms assembling intermediate goods, Yt(i), with
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a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) production technology Yt =
R 1
0
Yt(i)
p;t 1
p;t di
 p;t
p;t 1
, where p;t
denotes the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The corresponding price
index for the nal consumption good is Pt =
R 1
0
Pt(i)
1 p;tdi
 1
1 p;t , where Pt(i) is the price
of the intermediate good i. The optimal demand for Yt(i) is given by Yt(i) = (Pt(i)=Pt)
 p;t Yt.
The elasticity of substitution p;t follows:
p;t
p;t   1

=
 p
p   1
1 p  p;t 1
p;t   1
p
exp("p;t   p"p;t 1)
where "p;t  i.i.d. N
 
0; 2p

.
Monopolistically competitive rms produce intermediate goods using the production func-
tion:
Yt(i) = maxf(AtHt(i))1 Kt(i)   AtF ; 0g;
where Ht(i) and Kt(i) denote the homogenous labor and capital employed by rm i and
At represents exogenous economy-wide technological progress. The gross growth rate of
technology at  At=At 1 follows:
at = a
1 aaat 1 exp("a;t);
where a is the steady-state value of at and "a;t  i.i.d. N (0; 2a). F is a xed cost of
production that ensure that prots are zero in steady state.
As in Calvo (1983), a rm resets its price optimally with probability 1   p every pe-
riod. Firms that do not optimize adjust their price according to the simple partial dynamic
indexation rule:
Pt(i) = Pt 1(i)
p
t 1
1 p ;
where p measures the extent of indexation and  is the steady-state value of the gross
ination rate t  Pt=Pt 1. All optimizing rms choose a common price P t to maximize the
present discounted value of future prots:
Et
1X
k=0
kpQt;t+k

P t Xt;kYt+k(i) Wt+kHt+k(i) Rkt+kKt+k(i)

;
where
Xt;k 
(
(tt+1   t+k 1) (1 )k; k  1
1; k = 0
:
54
D.3 Government
D.3.1 Budget Constraint
Each period, the government collects lump-sum tax revenues Tt and issues one-period nominal
bonds Bt to nance its consumption Gt, and interest payments. Accordingly, the ow budget
constraint is given by:
Bt
Pt
= Rt 1
Bt 1
Pt
+Gt   Tt:
The ow budget constraint can be rewritten as:
R 1t bt = bt 1
1
t
yt 1
yy
At 1
At
+ ~Gt    t;
where bt  Rt BtPtYt denotes the real maturity value of government debt relative to output,
~Gt  GtYt ; and  t  TtYt .
D.3.2 Monetary Policy
The central bank sets the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor-type rule:
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
R "t
t
 Xt
Xt
Y #1 R
exp ("R;t) ;
which features interest rate smoothing and systematic responses to deviation of GDP from
its natural level Xt and deviation of ination from a time-varying target 

t .
27 R is the
steady-state value of Rt and the non-systematic monetary policy shock "R;t is assumed to
follow i.i.d. N (0; 2R). The ination target evolves exogenously as:
t = 
1   t 1 exp(";t);
where ";t  i.i.d. N (0; 2).
D.3.3 Fiscal Policy
The scal authority sets the tax revenues according to:
 t

=
 t 1

 "bt 1
b
~ #1 
;
27The natural level of output is the output that would prevail under exible wages and prices and in the
absence of time-variation in the elasticity of subsitution over di¤erentiated labor and goods varieties.
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which features tax smoothing and a systematic response to lagged debt.  is the steady-state
value of  t while b is the steady-state value of bt. Government spending follows an exogenous
process given by:
Gt =

1  1
gt

Yt
where the government spending shock follows:
gt = g
1 gg
g
t 1 exp("g;t);
where "g;t  i.i.d. N
 
0; 2g

:
D.4 Equilibrium
Equilibrium is characterized by the prices and quantities that satisfy the householdsand
rmsoptimality conditions, the government budget constraint, monetary and scal policy
rules, and the clearing conditions for the product, labor, and asset markets:Z 1
0
Cjt dj +Gt +
Z 1
0
Ijt dj + a(ut)
Z 1
0
Kjt 1dj = Yt;Z 1
0
Ht(i)di = HtZ 1
0
V jt dj=0;Z 1
0
Bjt dj=Bt:
Note that Cjt = Ct; I
j
t = It; and K
j
t 1 = Kt 1 due to the complete market assumption and
the separability between consumption and leisure. The capital accumulation equation in the
aggregate is then given by:
Kt = (1  d) Kt 1 + t

1  S

It
It 1

It:
and the aggregate resource constraint and the denition of GDP then take the form:
Ct + It +Gt + a(ut) Kt 1 = Yt
Xt = Ct + It +Gt:
56
D.5 Approximate Model
We rst solve the problem of households and rms given the monetary and scal policy rules
and derive the equilibrium conditions. We then use approximation methods to solve the
model. First, the model features a stochastic balanced growth path since the neutral tech-
nology shock contains a unit root. Therefore, we de-trend variables on the balanced growth
path by the level of the technology shock and write down all the equilibrium conditions of the
transformed model. Second, we compute the non-stochastic steady state of this transformed
model. Third, we obtain a rst-order approximation of the equilibrium conditions around
this steady state. We then solve the approximated model using standard methods.
For a variable Xt; let xt = XtAt : We denote by x^t the log-deviation from steady state of
xt; except for scal variables, which are in terms of deviation from steady state.
We also, dene some new variables: t = tPtAt; and t;which is the lagrange multiplier
on the capital accumulation equation for the households optimization problem (that is,
it is the shadow value of installed capital), %p;t =
p;t
p;t 1 ; and %l;t =
l;t
l;t 1 . We omit a
detailed derivation and the equations characterizing the approximate equilibrium, after some
manipulations, are given by:
y^t =
y + F
y
h
k^t + (1  )H^t
i
u^t = w^t + L^t   k^t
^t =

1 + p
Et^t+1 +
p
1 + p
^t 1 + p [ (u^t) + (1  )w^t] + p%^p;t
^t = R^t + Et

^t+1   a^t+1   ^t+1

^t =
a
(a  ) (a  )Etc^t+1  
a2 + 2
(a  ) (a  ) c^t +
a
(a  ) (a  ) c^t 1
+
aa   a
(a  ) (a  ) a^t +
(a  )
(a  ) ^t
^t = (1  d) a 1Et

^t+1   a^t+1

+
 
1  (1  d) a 1Et h^t+1   a^t+1 + u^t+1i
57
^t = ^t + ^t   a2S
00
(^{t   {^t 1 + a^t) + a2S 00Et [^{t+1   {^t + a^t+1]
k^t = u^t +
bkt 1   a^t
bkt = (1  d) a 1 bkt 1   a^t+  1  (1  d) a 1 (^t + u^t)
w^t =
1
1 + 
w^t 1 +

1 + 
Etw^t+1   w
h
w^t  

'Lt + ^t   ^t
i
+
w
1 + 
^t 1  
1 + p
1 + 
^t +

1 + 
Et^t+1
+
w
1 + 
a^t 1   1 + w   a
1 + 
a^t + w%^l;t
R^t = RR^t 1 + (1  R)

 (t   t ) + y (xt   xt )

+ "R;t
x^t = y^t   
k
y
u^t
1
g
y^t =
1
g
g^t +
c
y
c^t +
{
y
{^t +
k
y
u^t
b^t = 
 1b^t 1    1b [^t + y^t   y^t 1 + a^t]  R^ t +bR^t + R1
g
g^t:
^ t =  ^ t 1 + (1   ) b^t 1
where  = a

  (1  d) ; p = (1 p)(1 p)p(1+p) ; w =
(1 w)(1 w)
w(1+)(1+'l)
; and   b ~ :
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D.6 Parameterization
Table 2: Benchmark Parameterization
Parameter Value Description
 0.17 Capital share
d 0.025 Depreciation rate of capital
p 0.24 Price indexation
w 0.11 Wage indexation
100 log a 0.48 SS technology growth rate
 0.78 Consumption habit
1=
 
1  p

0.23 SS price markup
1=
 
1  l

0.15 SS wage markup
log H 0.38 SS log-hours
100(   1) 0.71 SS quarterly ination
100( 1   1) 0.13 Discount factor
' 3.79 Inverse Frisch elasticity
p 0.84 Calvo prices
w 0.70 Calvo wages
 5.30 Elasticity capital utilization costs
S
00
2.85 Investment adjustment costs
R 0.82 Monetary rule smoothing
 0.80 Fiscal rule smoothing
a 0.23 Neutral technology growth
g 0.99 Government spending
 0.72 Investment
p 0.94 Price markup
l 0.97 Wage markup
 0.67 Intertemporal preference
p 0.77 Price markup MA
l 0.91 Wage markup MA
100R 0.22 Monetary policy
100a 0.88 Neutral technology growth
100g 0.35 Government spending
100 6.03 Investment
100p 0.14 Price markup
100w 0.20 Wage markup
100 0.04 Intertemporal preference
b 0.40 SS public debt
g 0.22 SS government spending
y 0.07 Monetary rule output
 [0; 3] Monetary rule ination
 [ 0:1; 0:1] Fiscal rule public debt
Note: The benchmark values of the parameters other than  , b,  and  are the estimated median of
Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2010). The value of  is taken from Bhattarai, Lee and Park (2012)
and b is the sample average ratio of public debt to output in the U.S. For policy parameters  and  , we
try di¤erent values for comparative statics.
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D.7 Dynamics under alternative parameterization
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Figure 14: The response of ination to a one standard deviation increase in the investment
specic shock under an alternate parameterization (w = 0:3).
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